{"id":804080,"date":"2025-04-16T12:38:08","date_gmt":"2025-04-16T09:38:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/analyse.optim.biz\/?p=804080"},"modified":"2025-04-16T12:38:08","modified_gmt":"2025-04-16T09:38:08","slug":"infiintarea-si-extinderea-nato-xxiv-o-eroare-fatala-incorect-politic","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/analyse.optim.biz\/?p=804080","title":{"rendered":"\u00ceNFIIN\u021aAREA \u0218I EXTINDEREA NATO XXIV – \u201eO Eroare Fatal\u0103\u201d – Incorect Politic"},"content":{"rendered":"
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\u00ceNFIIN\u021aAREA \u0218I EXTINDEREA NATO XXIV \u2013 \u201eO Eroare Fatal\u0103\u201d<\/span><\/h1>\n
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Prof. Dr. Tiberiu Tudor
Incorect Politic<\/strong>
\nAprilie 16, 2025<\/p>\n

\"\u00ceNFIIN\u021aAREA<\/a><\/p>\n

\"\u00ceNFIIN\u021aAREA<\/p>\n

\u00ceNFIIN\u021aAREA \u0218I EXTINDEREA NATO XXIV \u2013 \u201eO Eroare Fatal\u0103\u201d<\/h2>\n

\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201eA Fateful Error<\/em><\/strong>\u201d\u00a0 \u0336 este titlul unui articol din 1997 [1] al lui George Kennan, unul dintre clasicii diploma\u021biei \u0219i politologiei americane.<\/p>\n

Cu cincizeci de ani \u00een urm\u0103, la 22 februarie 1946, Kennan era adjunctul ambasadorului Statelor Unite la Moscova. \u00cen aceast\u0103 calitate, a trimis Departamentului de Stat, Telegrama cea Lung\u0103<\/em><\/strong>, document definitoriu pentru viitoarea politic\u0103 a Statelor Unite de \u201econtainment\u201d (\u00eendiguire, st\u0103vilire) fa\u021b\u0103 de ideologia comunist\u0103 \u0219i Uniunea Sovietic\u0103 [2]. La 12 martie 1947 pre\u0219edintele Harry Truman a prezentat \u00een fa\u021ba Congresului liniile directoare ale politicii americane de \u00eengr\u0103dire a expansiunii comuniste (\u201eDoctrina Truman<\/em><\/strong>\u201d). Implementarea acestei doctrine\u00a0 \u00een domeniul militar a \u00eenceput odat\u0103 cu\u00a0 crearea Organiza\u021biei Tratatului Atlanticului de Nord, semnat la Washington, \u00een 4 aprilie 1949, de c\u0103tre conduc\u0103torii celor 12 state fondatoare.<\/p>\n

Peste o jum\u0103tate de secol, pozi\u021bia lui Kennan, de data aceasta \u00een raport cu Federa\u021bia Rus\u0103, s-a schimbat radical. \u00centre timp, prin tenacitatea diplomatic\u0103 a pre\u0219edin\u021bilor Ronald Reagan \u0219i Mihail Gorbaciov, lumea intrase pe f\u0103ga\u0219ul dezarm\u0103rii nucleare (Tratatul START I \u00a0fusese semnat \u0219i ratificat), R\u0103zboiul Rece se sf\u00e2r\u0219ise (sau p\u0103rea a se fi sf\u00e2r\u0219it).<\/p>\n

Ca deseori \u00een practica american\u0103, difuzarea unei idei \u0219ocante \u00eencepe cu mediul academic. \u00cen octombrie 1996, la Institutul Harriman al Universit\u0103\u021bii Columbia, adjunctul secretarului Departamentului de Stat, Strobe Talbott (ca amortizor) a prezentat planul expansiunii NATO. Reac\u021bia lui Kennan a fost dur\u0103: \u201cO eroare strategic\u0103 inept\u0103, de propor\u021bii epice\u201d (\u00aba strategic blunder of epic proportions\u00bb) \u0219i discu\u021biile au fost pe m\u0103sur\u0103 [3].<\/p>\n

Este de ad\u0103ugat c\u0103, la ora actual\u0103, dup\u0103 declasificarea documentelor acelei perioade, \u0219tim c\u0103 decizia expansiunii NATO, inclusiv calendarul extinderii, fusese luat\u0103 \u00eenc\u0103 din 7 septembrie 1993 [4]. Cercurile Casei Albe, Departamentului de Stat \u0219i Pentagonului primiser\u0103 circulara implement\u0103rii extinderii. Dar Clinton a respectat \u00een\u021belegerea f\u0103cut\u0103 cu El\u021b\u00een ca, p\u00e2n\u0103 la alegerile preziden\u021biale din 1996, s\u0103 fie pus\u0103 o surdin\u0103 \u00een privin\u021ba difuz\u0103rii ei.<\/p>\n

\u00cen februarie 1997, Kennan a exprimat, \u00een The New York Times, prima luare de pozi\u021bie critic\u0103 public\u0103 la adresa noului curs, explicitat \u00een toamna lui 1996, al politicii externe americane. Citez din \u201eA Fateful Error\u201d<\/em><\/strong>: \u201e La sf\u00e2r\u0219itul lui 1996, a devenit r\u0103sp\u00e2ndit\u0103 ideea c\u0103, \u00eentr-un mod nespecificat \u0219i \u00eentr-un loc nespecificat (\u00absomewhat and somewhere\u00bb), s-a decis expansiunea NATO p\u00e2n\u0103 la grani\u021bele Rusiei\u2026<\/strong>Vorbind tran\u0219ant, expansiunea NATO ar fi cea mai dezastruoas\u0103 eroare a politicii americane \u00een perioada post-R\u0103zboiul Rece (\u00abbluntly stated, is that expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era\u00bb). E de a\u0219teptat ca o astfel de decizie s\u0103 inflameze tendin\u021bele anti-occidentale \u0219i militariste \u00een opinia public\u0103 rus\u0103; s\u0103 aib\u0103 efecte adverse asupra dezvolt\u0103rii democra\u021biei \u00een Rusia; s\u0103 reinstaureze atmosfera R\u0103zboiului Rece \u00een rela\u021biile Est-Vest \u0219i s\u0103 \u00eemping\u0103 politica extern\u0103 a Rusiei \u00eentr-o direc\u021bie cu siguran\u021b\u0103 nu pe gustul nostru (\u00abdecidedly not to our liking \u00bb)\u201d [1], [3]. Previziunea a fost confirmat\u0103 de istorie. Cu adaosul c\u0103, prin eforturile sus\u021binute ale pre\u0219edin\u021bilor Bush-junior \u0219i Jo Biden \u0219i preten\u021biile aberante ale na\u021bionalismului ultra-xenofob ucrainean, r\u0103zboiul a devenit cald.<\/p>\n

\u00cenc\u0103 de la 26 iunie 1997, un grup de 50 exper\u021bi \u00een politic\u0103 extern\u0103, incluz\u00e2nd fo\u0219ti senatori, ofi\u021beri superiori \u00een retragere, diploma\u021bi \u0219i academicieni, i-a adresat pre\u0219edintelui Clinton o Scrisoare Deschis\u0103 [5], exprim\u00e2ndu-\u0219i opozi\u021bia fa\u021b\u0103 de hot\u0103r\u00e2rea extinderii NATO. Toate aceste personalit\u0103\u021bi de calibru ale administra\u021biilor, diploma\u021biei \u0219i politologiei americane fuseser\u0103, \u00een timpul R\u0103zboiului Rece, complet alinia\u021bi politicii de \u201econtainment\u201d antisovietic. Un exemplu ilustrativ este Robert McNamara, cel mai longeviv (1961-1968) secretar al Departamentului Ap\u0103r\u0103rii al SUA, promotor intransigent r\u0103zboiului din Vietnam, al liniei dure \u00een criza rachetelor din Cuba \u0219i al cursei \u00eenarm\u0103rii nucleare (politica de descurajare prin paritate de armament nuclear \u201eMAD \u00a0\u0336\u00a0 Mutual Assured Destruction\u201d).<\/p>\n

Avertismentele \u201cgrupului celor 50\u201d, s-au dovedit a fi profetice: \u201eDac\u0103 expansiunea va continua, atunci principala linie de divizare \u00een Europa va fi \u00eentre NATO \u0219i Rusia \u0219i rela\u021biile dintre ele vor fi confrunta\u021bionale\u2026Cu sau f\u0103r\u0103 Actul Fondator [NATO-Rusia], expansiunea NATO ne pune pe o traiectorie care duce la izolarea Rusiei \u0219i orientarea politicilor ei externe, interne \u0219i de securitate \u00eentr-o direc\u021bie nefavorabil\u0103 \u0219i nefericit\u0103\u2026 Cel mai mare pericol pentru Europa va fi dac\u0103 extinderea va \u00eendep\u0103rta (\u00abdrives away\u00bb) Rusia de Occident, o va \u00eendep\u0103rta de la democratizare, o va \u00eendep\u0103rta de la implicarea \u00een controlul armamentului conven\u021bional \u0219i nuclear, \u00eentr-o politic\u0103 a confrunt\u0103rii.\u201d A urmat o lung\u0103 argumenta\u021bie, contradictorie \u0219i ireconciliabil\u0103 [6], \u00eentre acest grup \u0219i administra\u021bia Clinton a c\u0103rei tez\u0103, \u00een esen\u021b\u0103, era \u201eun nou NATO \u0219i o nou\u0103 Rusie\u201d.<\/p>\n

\u00centr-un interviu publicat \u00een The New York Times la 2 mai 1998 [7], [8], imediat dup\u0103 ratificarea de c\u0103tre Senatul american a primului val al extinderii NATO, Kennan revine: \u201eCred c\u0103 este \u00eenceputul unui nou R\u0103zboi Rece\u2026Cred c\u0103 este o gre\u0219eal\u0103 tragic\u0103\u2026 Aceast\u0103 expansiune ar face P\u0103rin\u021bii Fondatori ai acestei \u021b\u0103ri s\u0103 se \u00eentoarc\u0103 \u00een morm\u00e2nt (\u00abThis expansion would make the Founding Fathers of this country turn over in their graves\u00bb). Ceea ce m\u0103 tulbur\u0103 este c\u00e2t de superficial\u0103 \u0219i neinformat\u0103 a fost \u00eentreaga dezbatere din Senat.\u201d<\/p>\n

Ast\u0103zi, c\u00e2nd efectele politicii de izolare a Rusiei de la construc\u021bia securit\u0103\u021bii europene au devenit evidente, George Kennan este diplomatul \u0219i politologul cel mai citat \u00een privin\u021ba impasului previzibil \u00een care a ajuns aceast\u0103 securitate.<\/p>\n

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\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

[1]George Kennan, A Fateful Error<\/em><\/strong>, The New York Times, 5 February 1997, p 23.<\/p>\n

https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/1997\/02\/05\/opinion\/a-fateful-error.html<\/a><\/p>\n

[2] T. Tudor, \u00cenfiin\u021barea \u0219i extinderea NATO\u00a0 \u0336<\/em><\/strong>. I. R\u0103zboiul Rece.<\/em><\/strong>
\n[3]Kaarel Piirim\u00e4e<\/a> \u201eGeopolitics of Sympathy: George F. Kennan and NATO Enlargement\u201d<\/em><\/strong>https:\/\/www.tandfonline.com\/doi\/full\/10.1080\/09592296.2024.2303860?src=recsys<\/a>
\n[4] Strategy for NATO\u2019 s Expansion and Transformation<\/em><\/strong>https:\/\/nsarchive.gwu.edu\/document\/16374-document-02-strategy-nato-s-expansion-and<\/a><\/p>\n

[5] Opposition to NATO Expansion<\/em>, Arms Control Today, vol. 27, iss. 4 (Jun\/Jul. 1997) <\/strong>https:\/\/www.proquest.com\/docview\/211254882?sourcetype=Scholarly%20Journals<\/a><\/p>\n

https:\/\/www.armscontrol.org\/act\/1997-06\/arms-control-today\/opposition-nato-expansion<\/a><\/p>\n

[6]The Debate Over NATO Expansion: A critique <\/em><\/strong>of the Clinton Administration\u2019s Responses to Key Questions, <\/em><\/strong>https:\/\/www.armscontrol.org\/act\/1997-09\/features\/debate-over-nato-expansion-critique-clinton-administrations-responses-key<\/a>
\n[7]https:\/\/archive.org\/details\/nato-expansion-a-tragic-mistake<\/a>
\n[8]https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/1998\/05\/02\/opinion\/foreign-affairs-now-a-word-from-x.html<\/a><\/p>\n

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Prof. Dr. Tiberiu Tudor<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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