{"id":803631,"date":"2025-05-08T06:11:43","date_gmt":"2025-05-08T03:11:43","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/analyse.optim.biz\/?p=803631"},"modified":"2025-05-08T06:11:43","modified_gmt":"2025-05-08T03:11:43","slug":"infiintarea-si-extinderea-nato-xxv-epilog-dilema-invingatorilor-incorect-politic","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/analyse.optim.biz\/?p=803631","title":{"rendered":"\u00ceNFIIN\u021aAREA \u0218I EXTINDEREA NATO – XXV. Epilog: Dilema \u00eenving\u0103torilor – Incorect Politic"},"content":{"rendered":"
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\u00ceNFIIN\u021aAREA \u0218I EXTINDEREA NATO \u2013 XXV. Epilog: Dilema \u00eenving\u0103torilor<\/span><\/h1>\n
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Prof.Dr. Tiberiu Tudor
Incorect Politic<\/strong>
\nMai 8, 2025<\/p>\n

\u00ceNFIIN\u021aAREA \u0218I EXTINDEREA NATO \u2013 XXV. Epilog: Dilema \u00eenving\u0103torilor<\/strong><\/h2>\n
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  1. \u00cencercuirea de la Furcile Caudine<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    \u00cen Cartea a IX-a a vastei sale opere De la \u00centemeierea Romei <\/em><\/strong>(Ab Urbe Condita<\/em><\/strong>) [1], Titus Livius relateaz\u0103 un episod al\u00a0 r\u0103zboaielor dintre romani \u0219i samni\u021bi, r\u0103mas \u00een istorie sub numele de \u00a0\u00cencercuirea de la Furcile Caudine<\/em><\/strong>. \u00cen cursul unei expedi\u021bii militare \u00eempotriva samni\u021bilor (321 B.C.), trupele romane au fost atrase \u0219i \u00eencercuite de samni\u021bi, \u00eentr-un \u021binut muntos, \u00eentre dou\u0103 trec\u0103tori, denumit Caudinae Furcae.<\/em><\/strong> Romanii nu puteau ie\u0219i din \u00eencercuire, dar tinerii lupt\u0103tori samni\u021bi, condu\u0219i de Gaius Pontius, nu \u0219tiau ce s\u0103 fac\u0103 \u00een continuare cu ei. Au trimis un mesager la fostul lor conduc\u0103tor, Herennius Pontius, tat\u0103l lui Gaius, un b\u0103tr\u00e2n \u00een\u021belept, retras din func\u021biile militare \u0219i civile. \u201eS\u0103 li se dea imediat drumul tuturor romanilor, f\u0103r\u0103 nici o jignire\u201d \u0336\u00a0 a fost r\u0103spunsul laconic al lui Herennius. Nemul\u021bumi\u021bi de o astfel de solu\u021bie, dup\u0103 o victorie de asemenea propor\u021bii, samni\u021bii au retrimis mesagerul la Herennius, pentru\u00a0 a-i solicita o alt\u0103 variant\u0103. \u201eTo\u021bi romanii, p\u00e2n\u0103 la ultimul, s\u0103 fie uci\u0219i\u201d \u0336\u00a0 a r\u0103spuns Herennius. Deconcerta\u021bi de antagonismul celor dou\u0103 r\u0103spunsuri \u00a0\u0336 \u201ede parc\u0103 erau r\u0103spunsurile echivoce ale oracolelor\u201d, comenteaz\u0103 Titus Livius\u00a0 \u0336 \u00a0tinerii \u00a0conduc\u0103tori samni\u021bi l-au adus pe Herennius la sfat, \u00een tab\u0103r\u0103. \u201eDac\u0103 \u00eei ve\u021bi elibera, ve\u021bi avea rela\u021bii pa\u0219nice cu cel mai puternic popor din lume. Dac\u0103 i-a\u021bi ucide pe to\u021bi, a\u021bi am\u00e2na r\u0103zboiul pentru c\u00e2teva genera\u021bii. Alt sfat nu v\u0103 pot da\u201d. Lupt\u0103torii samni\u021bi au ales ceea ce li s-a p\u0103rut o cale de mijloc: i-au l\u0103sat\u00a0 \u00een via\u021b\u0103 pe romani, dup\u0103 ce i-au umilit prin ritualul antic tradi\u021bional al \u201etrecerii pe sub jug\u201d. Trupele romane au fost dezarmate, celor doi consuli li s-au smuls mantiile de r\u0103zboi, osta\u0219ii legiunilor au trecut, unul c\u00e2te unul, pe sub culoarul jugului simbolic creat de propriile lor suli\u021be (pierderea suli\u021bei fiind cea mai mare dezonoare pentru un legionar roman). Pacea, dup\u0103 aceast\u0103 \u00eenfr\u00e2ngere \u0219i umilire a romanilor, a durat cinci ani, evident o Pace Rece; r\u0103zboaiele samnito \u2013 romane au durat cincizeci de ani. Ele au marcat \u00eenceputul cuceririi peninsulei italice de c\u0103tre romani.<\/p>\n

    \u00a0<\/p>\n

      \n
    1. Dilema \u00cenving\u0103torilor \u00een R\u0103zboiul Rece<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      Peste mai bine de dou\u0103 milenii, Statele Unite ale Americii \u0219i, implicit Europa Occidental\u0103, c\u00e2\u0219tigau, la fel de spectaculos \u0219i categoric, printr-o veritabil\u0103 \u00eencercuire (\u201econtainmentul\u201d), un r\u0103zboi de cu totul alte propor\u021bii\u00a0 \u0336\u00a0 R\u0103zboiul Rece. \u00cen politica extern\u0103 american\u0103 \u0219i occidental\u0103 a anilor 1989-1993 a existat o dilem\u0103 a \u00eenving\u0103torilor.<\/p>\n

      La summitul de la Malta, din 2-3 decembrie 1989, pre\u0219edintele G.H.W. Bush se exprima: \u201ePutem instaura o pace durabil\u0103 \u0219i transforma rela\u021bia Est-Vest \u00eentr-o cooperare \u00eendelungat\u0103. Acesta este viitorul pe care secretarul general Gorbaciov \u0219i cu mine \u00eel \u00eencepem aici, la Malta.\u201d Liderii europeni \u00eembr\u0103\u021bi\u0219aser\u0103 ideea lui Gorbaciov a Casei Comune Europene \u0219i a unei structuri de securitate pan-europene sub auspiciile CSCE (OSCE din 1995) [2]. Este bine cunoscut\u0103 obstina\u021bia lui Hans-Dietrich Genscher, ministrul de Externe \u0219i vicecancelar al Germaniei, \u00een a promova conceptul unei structuri de securitate euro-atlantice l\u0103rgite pe toat\u0103 emisfera nordic\u0103 (\u201ede la Vancouver la Vladivostok\u201d \u0336 \u00a0de fapt toate statele OSCE), ca pilon al securit\u0103\u021bii mondiale [3]. To\u021bi ace\u0219ti mari oameni de Stat, Reagan, Bush-senior, Mitterrand, Thatcher, erau politicieni maturi, forma\u021bi \u00een perioada R\u0103zboiului Rece, \u0219i care considerau c\u0103 \u00eencheierea acestui r\u0103zboi ofer\u0103 o \u0219ans\u0103 unic\u0103 \u00een schimbarea paradigmei de securitate mondial\u0103, de la una confrunta\u021bional\u0103, la una coopera\u021bional\u0103. Pe aceea\u0219i linie de g\u00e2ndire politic\u0103 s-au situat, \u00een 1997, George Kennan \u0219i \u201egrupul celor 50\u201d \u0336 \u00a0diploma\u021bi, oameni de Stat \u0219i politologi, din aceea\u0219i genera\u021bie\u00a0 \u0336\u00a0 care au contestat, plini de \u00eengrijorare, politica extern\u0103 a administra\u021biei Clinton, \u00een esen\u021b\u0103 neo-containmentul, aplicat de data aceasta Federa\u021biei Ruse.<\/p>\n

      \u00cen 1992 G.H.W. Bush a pierdut alegerile pentru al doilea mandat \u0219i, la 20 ianuarie 1993, a preluat func\u021bia preziden\u021bial\u0103 Bill Clinton, unul dintre cei mai tineri pre\u0219edin\u021bi americani (dup\u0103 J. F. Kennedy). \u00cen cele dou\u0103 mandate, t\u00e2n\u0103ra administra\u021bie Clinton a pus bazele instaur\u0103rii \u201eleadershipului american \u00een NATO \u0219i Europa\u201d ([4], p. 7), prin ocuparea total\u0103 a vidului de putere creat \u00een\u00a0 Europa de Est \u00een urma imploziei Uniunii Sovietice.<\/p>\n

      \u0218tim ast\u0103zi, dup\u0103 declasific\u0103rile corespunz\u0103toare, c\u0103 documentele doctrinare de baz\u0103 care au definit noua strategie a politicii externe a Statelor Unite au fost:<\/p>\n

      \u2013 Ghidul Planific\u0103rii Ap\u0103r\u0103rii<\/em><\/strong> (DPG\u00a0 \u0336 \u201cDefence Planning Guidance\u201d), un document de 97 pagini, elaborat \u00een 1992 pentru perioada 1994-1999, de c\u0103tre Departamentul Ap\u0103r\u0103rii al Statelor Unite, condus la acea dat\u0103 de c\u0103tre Dick \u00a0Cheney, unul dintre lupii tineri ai liniei dure a politicii externe americane. Esen\u021ba acestui document, par\u021bial declasificat \u00een 2008 [4], cunoscut ca \u00a0Doctrina Wolfowitz [5], este: Statele Unite, r\u0103mase unic\u0103 superputere mondial\u0103, trebuie s\u0103 \u00een\u0103bu\u0219e \u00een fa\u0219\u0103 orice \u00eencercare de constituire a unei puteri regionale sau globale competitive lor, dac\u0103 este cazul prin r\u0103zboaie preventive, cu sau f\u0103r\u0103 acordul organiza\u021biilor interna\u021bionale de resort. Cu alte cuvinte unipolaritatea politic\u0103, bazat\u0103 pe \u201eexcep\u021bionalismul american\u201d. Una dintre indica\u021biile DPG este: \u201eTrebuie s\u0103 ac\u021bion\u0103m pentru a preveni crearea unor aranjamente de securitate pur europene care ar eroda NATO (\u00abEuropean-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO\u00bb).<\/p>\n

      \u2013 Strategia Expansiunii \u0219i Transform\u0103rii NATO <\/em><\/strong>[6], document declasificat \u00een 2018, din care reiese c\u0103 strategia \u0219i calendarul expansiunii NATO fuseser\u0103 elaborate la Washington \u00eenc\u0103 din septembrie 1993. Aceast\u0103 strategie a fost completat\u0103 cu \u00eenfiin\u021barea Consiliului NATO-Rusia, care\u00a0 \u0336\u00a0 dup\u0103 caracterizarea expresiv\u0103 a lui Strobe Talbott, adjunct al secretarului de Stat \u00eentre 1994 \u0219i 2001 \u0336 \u00a0a avut rolul \u201ede a \u021bine Rusia sub acela\u0219i acoper\u0103m\u00e2nt cu partenerii no\u0219tri NATO cheie, dar la un bra\u021b distan\u021b\u0103, docil\u0103 pentru moment, \u00eenchis\u0103 \u00eentr-o rezerva\u021bie (\u00abit was still being kept at arm\u2019s length, docile for the moment, but confined to a reservation\u00bb)\u2026Vederile Rusiei contau prea pu\u021bin pe arena interna\u021bional\u0103\u201d ([7], p.24; [8], p.123).<\/p>\n

      Ambele documente pot fi accesate liber \u00een Arhivele Securit\u0103\u021bii Na\u021bionale a Statelor Unite (https:\/\/nsarchive.gwu.edu\/<\/a> ), la linkurile indicate.<\/p>\n

      Voi cita, \u00een \u00eencheiere, p\u0103rerile retrospective a dou\u0103 personalit\u0103\u021bi politice care au f\u0103cut parte din administra\u021biile americane care au avut un rol hot\u0103r\u00e2tor (\u0219i agresiv) \u00een impunerea acestei politici externe\u00a0 \u0336\u00a0 administra\u021biile Bush-junior \u0219i Jo Biden.<\/p>\n

      Robert M. Gates a fost secretarul de Stat al Departamentului Ap\u0103r\u0103rii al Statelor Unite \u00eentre 2006 \u0219i 2011 (numit \u00een func\u021bie de c\u0103tre Bush-junior). \u00cen memoriile sale, publicate \u00een 2014 [9], dup\u0103 retragerea din politic\u0103, Gates afirm\u0103: \u201eRela\u021bia cu Rusia a fost prost gestionat\u0103 dup\u0103 ce G.H.W. Bush [Bush senior] a p\u0103r\u0103sit pre\u0219edin\u021bia, \u00een 1993\u201d. Gates a fost un promotor al absorb\u021biei \u00een NATO a Europei de Est, inclusiv a Balticelor, dar a considerat inten\u021bia Statelor Unite de a extinde NATO la Ucraina \u0219i Georgia (exprimat\u0103 de c\u0103tre pre\u0219edintele George Bush [junior] \u0219i secretarul de Stat Condoleezza Rice \u00een 2008 la summitul de la Bucure\u0219ti) o \u201eprovocare monumental\u0103\u201d ([9], p.157-158).<\/p>\n

      William Burns, adjunct al secretarului Departamentului de Stat al Statelor Unite \u00eentre 2011 \u0219i 2014 \u0219i viitor director al CIA \u00een administra\u021bia Biden declara, \u00eentr-un interviu din 2019, c\u0103 politica fa\u021b\u0103 de Federa\u021bia Rus\u0103 a fost trecut\u0103 pe \u201epilot automat\u201d, f\u0103r\u0103 lua \u00een considerare \u00eentregul ei impact asupra g\u00e2ndirii ruse [10].<\/p>\n

      Comenzile pilotului automat au fost instalate \u00eenc\u0103 din 1993 \u00a0\u0336 sunt documentele doctrinare men\u021bionate mai sus\u00a0 \u0336\u00a0 \u0219i nu aveau cum s\u0103 nu duc\u0103 la escaladarea confrunt\u0103rii dintre cele dou\u0103 mari puteri nucleare, ast\u0103zi din nou \u00eenarmate p\u00e2n\u0103 \u00een din\u021bi. \u00cen continuare evenimentele au urmat, \u00eentr-o logic\u0103 absolut cauzal\u0103 \u0219i previzibil\u0103, programul confrunta\u021bional al acestui pilot automat.<\/p>\n

      Proiectul lui Reagan \u0219i Gorbaciov, al unei lumi f\u0103r\u0103 arme nucleare, a fost una dintre scurtele himere pacifiste ale lumii.<\/p>\n

      \u00a0<\/p>\n

      \u00a0<\/p>\n

      [1] Titus Livius, De la Fundarea Romei<\/em><\/strong>, Editura \u0218tiin\u021bific\u0103, Bucure\u0219ti, 1959.
      \n[2] T. Tudor, \u00cenfiin\u021barea \u0219i extinderea NATO <\/em><\/strong>\u00a0\u0336 \u00a0IV. Ce asigur\u0103ri a primit Gorbaciov?<\/em><\/strong>
      \n[3] Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Meine Sicht der Dinge. Im Gespr\u00e4ch mit Hans-Dieter Heumann<\/em><\/strong>.\u00a0Propyl\u00e4en, Berlin, 2015,       https:\/\/www.frontiere.info\/cooperative-world-order-the-vision-of-hans-dietrich-genscher\/<\/a>
      \n[4] Defence Planning Guidance for Years 1994-1999.<\/p>\n

      https:\/\/www.archives.gov\/files\/declassification\/iscap\/pdf\/2008-003-docs1-12.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

      [5] T. Tudor, \u00cenfiin\u021barea \u0219i extinderea NATO <\/em><\/strong>\u00a0\u0336\u00a0 V. Doctrina Wolfowitz<\/em><\/strong>
      \n[6] Strategy \u00a0for NATO\u2019 s Expansion and Transformation<\/em><\/strong>      https:\/\/nsarchive.gwu.edu\/document\/16374-document-02-strategy-nato-s-expansion-and<\/a>
      \n[7] S. Radchenko,<\/em>Nothing but humiliation for Russia<\/em><\/strong>, Journal of Strategic Studies, 43<\/strong> (6-7),       https:\/\/orca.cardiff.ac.uk\/id\/eprint\/135043\/1\/Nothing+but+Humiliation+for+Russia.pdf<\/a>
      \n[8] Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand<\/em><\/strong>: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy<\/em><\/strong>,\u00a0<\/em>New York Random House, 2002.
      \n[9] Robert M. Gates,\u00a0Duty: memoirs of a secretary at war<\/em><\/strong>\u00a0(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014).
      \n[10] Matt Peterson, A brief history of US\u2013Russian missteps<\/em><\/strong>,\u00a0The Atlantic, 11 March 2019,\u00a0      https:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/membership\/archive\/2019\/03\/a-brief-history-of-us-russian-missteps\/584542<\/a><\/p>\n

      Prof. Dr. Tiberiu Tudor<\/p>\n

      \u00a0<\/p>\n

      Mul\u021bumesc directorilor \u0219i redactorilor revistelor on-line\u00a0 \u0336\u00a0 personalit\u0103\u021bi de mare curaj patriotic \u0219i civic\u00a0 \u0336\u00a0 care au f\u0103cut posibil\u0103 publicarea acestui serial informativ \u00een mass-media rom\u00e2neasc\u0103.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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