{"id":2233086,"date":"2026-11-02T15:25:14","date_gmt":"2026-11-02T12:25:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/analyse.optim.biz\/?p=2233086"},"modified":"2026-11-02T15:25:14","modified_gmt":"2026-11-02T12:25:14","slug":"how-serious-are-irans-new-threats-of-retaliation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/analyse.optim.biz\/?p=2233086","title":{"rendered":"How serious are Iran’s new threats of retaliation?"},"content":{"rendered":"

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https:\/\/p.dw.com\/p\/5Oxtw<\/span><\/div>\n<\/section>\n
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The Reuters news agency cited three senior Iranian officials and an additional source as saying that Tehran has deliberately prolonged talks to weaken Trump politicallyImage: Brendan Smialowski\/AFP<\/small><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n
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The US Republican Party<\/a> is entering the midterm elections<\/a> with Donald Trump<\/a>‘s administration seemingly unable to either win or diplomatically resolve the Iran war<\/a>. If the Republican lose control of the US Congress<\/a>, the administration will have to navigate an entirely different political landscape for the rest of Trump’s second term, but the course of the war is not decided just in Washington \u2014 or in Tehran.<\/p>\n

Seeking to identify key factors that could tip the balance towards war or peace in Iran<\/a>, DW spoke to three analysts: Omid Memarian of DAWN, a Washington-based think tank focused on reforming US Middle East policy; Finland-based\u00a0political scientist Leila Morrovati; and Babak Rezaei Daryakenari of Leiden University in the Netherlands.<\/p>\n

1. US midterms: Is Trump set for more scrutiny?<\/span><\/h2>\n

A Democratic victory would push Trump to focus more on domestic issues and would likely expose the financial costs of the war in the US Congress, Omid Memarian told DW. However,\u00a0Trump could continue limited strikes on Iran<\/a> without formally declaring war.<\/p>\n

Memarian predicts that Trump will seek a way out that “saves face” after the Tuesday election.<\/p>\n

Referring to Trump, the analyst says Tehran is engaged in a “big gamble with someone who does not behave like a conventional politician.” This increases the risk of renewed attacks.<\/p>\n

\n

How serious are Iran’s new threats of retaliation?<\/h2>\n

Babak Rezaei Daryakenari makes a similar point: “The president has broad authority and freedom of action, especially in foreign policy and the conduct of military operations. A Republican defeat, even with increased pressure from Congress, doesn’t necessarily stop new attacks.”<\/p>\n

2. Political deadlock in Israel puts pressure on Netanyahu<\/h2>\n

Israel’s October 27 election<\/a> ended in deadlock. Neither the coalition around incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu<\/a>, nor the camp supporting former IDF chief Gadi Eisenkot managed to secure an outright majority.<\/p>\n

Memarian warns the political uncertainty could push Netanyahu to take serious moves while he still wields power, making the transition period the “most fragile and dangerous” for renewed escalation.<\/p>\n

\n

No clear winner emerges in Israel’s election<\/h2>\n

A change of government in Israel would not fundamentally alter Israel’s Iran policy<\/a>, Memarian says. Netanyahu’s main rival, former military chief Gadi Eisenkot, “may be more deferential to America” and coordinate more closely with Washington. But ties with Trump are personal, and Eisenkot “certainly won’t be like Netanyahu, who could sell any plan or scenario to Trump.”<\/p>\n

Rezaei Daryakenari stresses that Israel<\/a>‘s security concerns about Iran “are not limited to Netanyahu himself.” A new government could change the timing of a confrontation and its coordination with Washington, but the security establishment and ruling coalition would also shape the risk of an attack, he said.<\/p>\n

3. The nuclear impasse: US and Iran working from different playbooks<\/h2>\n

Iran’s nuclear program remains the biggest open issue between Washington and Tehran, with the US<\/a> rejecting the Iranian narrative that the program is meant only for civilian use<\/a>.<\/p>\n

But the two sides are also at odds on how the talks themselves should be set up, says Memarian.<\/p>\n

“The US wants negotiations to start not only with a focus on Iran’s nuclear program but with concessions right at the outset,” he said.<\/p>\n

Iran, by contrast, wants sanctions lifted and frozen assets released<\/a> before nuclear talks begin. If the sides don’t move closer, Memarian warns, the odds of a renewed war rise.<\/p>\n

Until the sides agree on an agenda, he says, they are likely to keep “climbing the ladder of tension.”<\/p>\n

Leila Morovati, a Finland-based political analyst, says the nuclear program is “the crux” of the standoff. Tehran sees it as a survival guarantee and bargaining chip, she argues. In turn, Washington fears that a nuclear Iran would upend its security calculations and long-term strategy for the Middle East and beyond, which is why it insists on putting the issue on the table first.<\/p>\n

4. The Strait of Hormuz: Is Iran’s leverage also a risk factor?<\/h2>\n

Before the Iran war was launched in late February, about 20% of the world’s oil passed through the Strait of Hormuz<\/a>.\u00a0 Iran has since drastically cut on the energy exports through the naval chokepoint<\/a>, using at as leverage on US and Israel.<\/p>\n

But Memarian argues that Iranian restrictions in the strait won’t trigger escalation on their own.<\/p>\n

If Washington decides a broader attack is needed to change Tehran’s calculations, any incident could serve as a pretext, he says. If Washington considers the risks too high, it may opt for an economic blockade while keeping negotiations on the table. In that scenario, “even occasional tensions in the Strait of Hormuz won’t pull America into war,” according to the US-based analyst.<\/p>\n

5. The Houthis in Yemen: Iran’s allies, not subordinates<\/h2>\n

The Houthi rebels in Yemen have also been targeting energy exports in the Red Sea, including attacks on Saudi cities and infrastructure. But Memarian notes the Yemeni rebels’ roots and struggle are “entirely domestic and organic” despite their ideological closeness to Tehran.<\/p>\n

Memarian says the Houthis<\/a> make “pragmatic calculations” and their actions do not necessarily translate into an escalation between Iran and the US.<\/p>\n

Still, the US could use the rebels’ action as a pretext to strike Iran again.<\/p>\n

\n

More fighting between Yemen’s Houthis, Saudi Arabia<\/h2>\n

Rezaei Daryakenari offers a slightly different assessment. Houthi attacks on shipping and on countries in the region, he says, “can both widen the war and accelerate coalition-building against the Islamic Republic.” Countries that don’t want war with Tehran “may turn to closer military cooperation to protect their trade and security.” That doesn’t necessarily mean entering the war directly, he adds, “but it could narrow the Islamic Republic’s room for maneuver.”<\/p>\n

6. Regional mediators: Four countries with a lot at stake<\/h2>\n

With direct talks between Iran and the US stalled, the world turned its attention to Qatar, Oman, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. While each nation plays a different role in the crisis, they all have a direct stake in ending the war<\/a>.<\/p>\n

“They are close to the US but also want to maintain ties with Iran and build regional alliances to prevent future conflicts,” Memarian says.<\/p>\n

Morovati says Washington’s failure to support its Arab allies during the war could eventually push them to reconsider their policies and turn to America’s rivals.<\/p>\n

7. What will the Trump administration\u00a0do after the election?<\/h2>\n

During the campaign, US President Trump said he expected a deal with Tehran soon after the midterms vote. Meanwhile, the Reuters news agency cited three senior Iranian officials and an additional source as saying that Tehran has deliberately prolonged talks to weaken Trump politically.<\/p>\n

Memarian says Iran’s leaders believe a Republican defeat would increase pressure on Trump to end the war. But Trump will remain the key foreign policy decision-maker, and congressional pressure is unlikely to play a deciding role.<\/p>\n

He says the present moment offers the “best opportunity” to end the standoff before Trump leaves office in January 2029.<\/p>\n

“Iran’s leaders need to think about their endgame,” Memarian says, warning that Trump could launch a massive attack, inflict serious damage and then declare victory.<\/p>\n

\n

Iran conflict: Could a new phase of the war be imminent?<\/h2>\n

Daryakenari says “escalatory factors” will have the upper hand in the coming months and the likelihood of a military escalation is high.<\/p>\n

Tehran can only avert a new round of war with a fundamental policy shift\u00a0and concessions that Iranian leaders would see as close to surrender. However, he argues that such a retreat would also threaten the regime’s survival by weakening its ideological justification and eroding support.<\/p>\n

8. The economic toll: Warring parties not yet at breaking point<\/h2>\n

High oil prices, shipping risks and economic strain<\/a> are putting pressure on all sides as the war enters its ninth month. Could that push Tehran, Washington and regional capitals toward compromise?<\/p>\n

“The economy is the Achilles’ heel of every party to this war, and that holds even for countries beyond the region,” says Leila Morrovati.<\/p>\n

Energy prices as a source of pressure on the US government<\/a>,\u00a0she acknowledges.<\/p>\n

\u00a0“We’ve seen that energy supply and the expectations of the American public have been influential, and this is one of the problems the Trump administration faces,” she said.<\/p>\n

At the same time, she warns that the Arab states\u00a0do not act as a united bloc toward Tehran.<\/p>\n

“If they come under severe security and economic pressure, they may take joint action, but so far that hasn’t happened in practice,” she underlines.<\/p>\n

\n

What now for Saudi Arabia after Riyadh airport attack?<\/h2>\n

Memarian also sees the economic costs as an incentive for a deal. But he also claims that each side believes that inflicting more pain on the other will strengthen its hand in future talks.<\/p>\n

“That can easily turn this into a war of attrition, and in recent months that has been the approach,” he says. Neither side has yet reached the point where it sees compromise as unavoidable.<\/p>\n

Edited by: Darko Janjevic<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/article>\n

\n

The US Republican Party<\/a> is entering the midterm elections<\/a> with Donald Trump<\/a>‘s administration seemingly unable to either win or diplomatically resolve the Iran war<\/a>. If the Republican lose control of the US Congress<\/a>, the administration will have to navigate an entirely different political landscape for the rest of Trump’s second term, but the course of the war is not decided just in Washington \u2014 or in Tehran.<\/p>\n

Seeking to identify key factors that could tip the balance towards war or peace in Iran<\/a>, DW spoke to three analysts: Omid Memarian of DAWN, a Washington-based think tank focused on reforming US Middle East policy; Finland-based\u00a0political scientist Leila Morrovati; and Babak Rezaei Daryakenari of Leiden University in the Netherlands.<\/p>\n

1. US midterms: Is Trump set for more scrutiny?<\/span><\/h2>\n

A Democratic victory would push Trump to focus more on domestic issues and would likely expose the financial costs of the war in the US Congress, Omid Memarian told DW. However,\u00a0Trump could continue limited strikes on Iran<\/a> without formally declaring war.<\/p>\n

Memarian predicts that Trump will seek a way out that “saves face” after the Tuesday election.<\/p>\n

Referring to Trump, the analyst says Tehran is engaged in a “big gamble with someone who does not behave like a conventional politician.” This increases the risk of renewed attacks.<\/p>\n

\n

How serious are Iran’s new threats of retaliation?<\/h2>\n

Babak Rezaei Daryakenari makes a similar point: “The president has broad authority and freedom of action, especially in foreign policy and the conduct of military operations. A Republican defeat, even with increased pressure from Congress, doesn’t necessarily stop new attacks.”<\/p>\n

2. Political deadlock in Israel puts pressure on Netanyahu<\/h2>\n

Israel’s October 27 election<\/a> ended in deadlock. Neither the coalition around incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu<\/a>, nor the camp supporting former IDF chief Gadi Eisenkot managed to secure an outright majority.<\/p>\n

Memarian warns the political uncertainty could push Netanyahu to take serious moves while he still wields power, making the transition period the “most fragile and dangerous” for renewed escalation.<\/p>\n

\n

No clear winner emerges in Israel’s election<\/h2>\n

A change of government in Israel would not fundamentally alter Israel’s Iran policy<\/a>, Memarian says. Netanyahu’s main rival, former military chief Gadi Eisenkot, “may be more deferential to America” and coordinate more closely with Washington. But ties with Trump are personal, and Eisenkot “certainly won’t be like Netanyahu, who could sell any plan or scenario to Trump.”<\/p>\n

Rezaei Daryakenari stresses that Israel<\/a>‘s security concerns about Iran “are not limited to Netanyahu himself.” A new government could change the timing of a confrontation and its coordination with Washington, but the security establishment and ruling coalition would also shape the risk of an attack, he said.<\/p>\n

3. The nuclear impasse: US and Iran working from different playbooks<\/h2>\n

Iran’s nuclear program remains the biggest open issue between Washington and Tehran, with the US<\/a> rejecting the Iranian narrative that the program is meant only for civilian use<\/a>.<\/p>\n

But the two sides are also at odds on how the talks themselves should be set up, says Memarian.<\/p>\n

“The US wants negotiations to start not only with a focus on Iran’s nuclear program but with concessions right at the outset,” he said.<\/p>\n

Iran, by contrast, wants sanctions lifted and frozen assets released<\/a> before nuclear talks begin. If the sides don’t move closer, Memarian warns, the odds of a renewed war rise.<\/p>\n

Until the sides agree on an agenda, he says, they are likely to keep “climbing the ladder of tension.”<\/p>\n

Leila Morovati, a Finland-based political analyst, says the nuclear program is “the crux” of the standoff. Tehran sees it as a survival guarantee and bargaining chip, she argues. In turn, Washington fears that a nuclear Iran would upend its security calculations and long-term strategy for the Middle East and beyond, which is why it insists on putting the issue on the table first.<\/p>\n

4. The Strait of Hormuz: Is Iran’s leverage also a risk factor?<\/h2>\n

Before the Iran war was launched in late February, about 20% of the world’s oil passed through the Strait of Hormuz<\/a>.\u00a0 Iran has since drastically cut on the energy exports through the naval chokepoint<\/a>, using at as leverage on US and Israel.<\/p>\n

But Memarian argues that Iranian restrictions in the strait won’t trigger escalation on their own.<\/p>\n

If Washington decides a broader attack is needed to change Tehran’s calculations, any incident could serve as a pretext, he says. If Washington considers the risks too high, it may opt for an economic blockade while keeping negotiations on the table. In that scenario, “even occasional tensions in the Strait of Hormuz won’t pull America into war,” according to the US-based analyst.<\/p>\n

5. The Houthis in Yemen: Iran’s allies, not subordinates<\/h2>\n

The Houthi rebels in Yemen have also been targeting energy exports in the Red Sea, including attacks on Saudi cities and infrastructure. But Memarian notes the Yemeni rebels’ roots and struggle are “entirely domestic and organic” despite their ideological closeness to Tehran.<\/p>\n

Memarian says the Houthis<\/a> make “pragmatic calculations” and their actions do not necessarily translate into an escalation between Iran and the US.<\/p>\n

Still, the US could use the rebels’ action as a pretext to strike Iran again.<\/p>\n

\n

More fighting between Yemen’s Houthis, Saudi Arabia<\/h2>\n

Rezaei Daryakenari offers a slightly different assessment. Houthi attacks on shipping and on countries in the region, he says, “can both widen the war and accelerate coalition-building against the Islamic Republic.” Countries that don’t want war with Tehran “may turn to closer military cooperation to protect their trade and security.” That doesn’t necessarily mean entering the war directly, he adds, “but it could narrow the Islamic Republic’s room for maneuver.”<\/p>\n

6. Regional mediators: Four countries with a lot at stake<\/h2>\n

With direct talks between Iran and the US stalled, the world turned its attention to Qatar, Oman, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. While each nation plays a different role in the crisis, they all have a direct stake in ending the war<\/a>.<\/p>\n

“They are close to the US but also want to maintain ties with Iran and build regional alliances to prevent future conflicts,” Memarian says.<\/p>\n

Morovati says Washington’s failure to support its Arab allies during the war could eventually push them to reconsider their policies and turn to America’s rivals.<\/p>\n

7. What will the Trump administration\u00a0do after the election?<\/h2>\n

During the campaign, US President Trump said he expected a deal with Tehran soon after the midterms vote. Meanwhile, the Reuters news agency cited three senior Iranian officials and an additional source as saying that Tehran has deliberately prolonged talks to weaken Trump politically.<\/p>\n

Memarian says Iran’s leaders believe a Republican defeat would increase pressure on Trump to end the war. But Trump will remain the key foreign policy decision-maker, and congressional pressure is unlikely to play a deciding role.<\/p>\n

He says the present moment offers the “best opportunity” to end the standoff before Trump leaves office in January 2029.<\/p>\n

“Iran’s leaders need to think about their endgame,” Memarian says, warning that Trump could launch a massive attack, inflict serious damage and then declare victory.<\/p>\n

\n

Iran conflict: Could a new phase of the war be imminent?<\/h2>\n

Daryakenari says “escalatory factors” will have the upper hand in the coming months and the likelihood of a military escalation is high.<\/p>\n

Tehran can only avert a new round of war with a fundamental policy shift\u00a0and concessions that Iranian leaders would see as close to surrender. However, he argues that such a retreat would also threaten the regime’s survival by weakening its ideological justification and eroding support.<\/p>\n

8. The economic toll: Warring parties not yet at breaking point<\/h2>\n

High oil prices, shipping risks and economic strain<\/a> are putting pressure on all sides as the war enters its ninth month. Could that push Tehran, Washington and regional capitals toward compromise?<\/p>\n

“The economy is the Achilles’ heel of every party to this war, and that holds even for countries beyond the region,” says Leila Morrovati.<\/p>\n

Energy prices as a source of pressure on the US government<\/a>,\u00a0she acknowledges.<\/p>\n

\u00a0“We’ve seen that energy supply and the expectations of the American public have been influential, and this is one of the problems the Trump administration faces,” she said.<\/p>\n

At the same time, she warns that the Arab states\u00a0do not act as a united bloc toward Tehran.<\/p>\n

“If they come under severe security and economic pressure, they may take joint action, but so far that hasn’t happened in practice,” she underlines.<\/p>\n

\n

What now for Saudi Arabia after Riyadh airport attack?<\/h2>\n

Memarian also sees the economic costs as an incentive for a deal. But he also claims that each side believes that inflicting more pain on the other will strengthen its hand in future talks.<\/p>\n

“That can easily turn this into a war of attrition, and in recent months that has been the approach,” he says. Neither side has yet reached the point where it sees compromise as unavoidable.<\/p>\n

Edited by: Darko Janjevic<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

The US Republican Party<\/a> is entering the midterm elections<\/a> with Donald Trump<\/a>‘s administration seemingly unable to either win or diplomatically resolve the Iran war<\/a>. If the Republican lose control of the US Congress<\/a>, the administration will have to navigate an entirely different political landscape for the rest of Trump’s second term, but the course of the war is not decided just in Washington \u2014 or in Tehran.<\/p>\n

Seeking to identify key factors that could tip the balance towards war or peace in Iran<\/a>, DW spoke to three analysts: Omid Memarian of DAWN, a Washington-based think tank focused on reforming US Middle East policy; Finland-based\u00a0political scientist Leila Morrovati; and Babak Rezaei Daryakenari of Leiden University in the Netherlands.<\/p>\n

A Democratic victory would push Trump to focus more on domestic issues and would likely expose the financial costs of the war in the US Congress, Omid Memarian told DW. However,\u00a0Trump could continue limited strikes on Iran<\/a> without formally declaring war.<\/p>\n

Memarian predicts that Trump will seek a way out that “saves face” after the Tuesday election.<\/p>\n

Referring to Trump, the analyst says Tehran is engaged in a “big gamble with someone who does not behave like a conventional politician.” This increases the risk of renewed attacks.<\/p>\n

To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video<\/a><\/p>\n

Babak Rezaei Daryakenari makes a similar point: “The president has broad authority and freedom of action, especially in foreign policy and the conduct of military operations. A Republican defeat, even with increased pressure from Congress, doesn’t necessarily stop new attacks.”<\/p>\n

Israel’s October 27 election<\/a> ended in deadlock. Neither the coalition around incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu<\/a>, nor the camp supporting former IDF chief Gadi Eisenkot managed to secure an outright majority.<\/p>\n

Memarian warns the political uncertainty could push Netanyahu to take serious moves while he still wields power, making the transition period the “most fragile and dangerous” for renewed escalation.<\/p>\n

To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video<\/a><\/p>\n

A change of government in Israel would not fundamentally alter Israel’s Iran policy<\/a>, Memarian says. Netanyahu’s main rival, former military chief Gadi Eisenkot, “may be more deferential to America” and coordinate more closely with Washington. But ties with Trump are personal, and Eisenkot “certainly won’t be like Netanyahu, who could sell any plan or scenario to Trump.”<\/p>\n

Rezaei Daryakenari stresses that Israel<\/a>‘s security concerns about Iran “are not limited to Netanyahu himself.” A new government could change the timing of a confrontation and its coordination with Washington, but the security establishment and ruling coalition would also shape the risk of an attack, he said.<\/p>\n

Iran’s nuclear program remains the biggest open issue between Washington and Tehran, with the US<\/a> rejecting the Iranian narrative that the program is meant only for civilian use<\/a>.<\/p>\n

But the two sides are also at odds on how the talks themselves should be set up, says Memarian.<\/p>\n

“The US wants negotiations to start not only with a focus on Iran’s nuclear program but with concessions right at the outset,” he said.<\/p>\n

Iran, by contrast, wants sanctions lifted and frozen assets released<\/a> before nuclear talks begin. If the sides don’t move closer, Memarian warns, the odds of a renewed war rise.<\/p>\n

Until the sides agree on an agenda, he says, they are likely to keep “climbing the ladder of tension.”<\/p>\n

Leila Morovati, a Finland-based political analyst, says the nuclear program is “the crux” of the standoff. Tehran sees it as a survival guarantee and bargaining chip, she argues. In turn, Washington fears that a nuclear Iran would upend its security calculations and long-term strategy for the Middle East and beyond, which is why it insists on putting the issue on the table first.<\/p>\n

Before the Iran war was launched in late February, about 20% of the world’s oil passed through the Strait of Hormuz<\/a>.\u00a0 Iran has since drastically cut on the energy exports through the naval chokepoint<\/a>, using at as leverage on US and Israel.<\/p>\n

But Memarian argues that Iranian restrictions in the strait won’t trigger escalation on their own.<\/p>\n

If Washington decides a broader attack is needed to change Tehran’s calculations, any incident could serve as a pretext, he says. If Washington considers the risks too high, it may opt for an economic blockade while keeping negotiations on the table. In that scenario, “even occasional tensions in the Strait of Hormuz won’t pull America into war,” according to the US-based analyst.<\/p>\n

The Houthi rebels in Yemen have also been targeting energy exports in the Red Sea, including attacks on Saudi cities and infrastructure. But Memarian notes the Yemeni rebels’ roots and struggle are “entirely domestic and organic” despite their ideological closeness to Tehran.<\/p>\n

Memarian says the Houthis<\/a> make “pragmatic calculations” and their actions do not necessarily translate into an escalation between Iran and the US.<\/p>\n

Still, the US could use the rebels’ action as a pretext to strike Iran again.<\/p>\n

To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video<\/a><\/p>\n

Rezaei Daryakenari offers a slightly different assessment. Houthi attacks on shipping and on countries in the region, he says, “can both widen the war and accelerate coalition-building against the Islamic Republic.” Countries that don’t want war with Tehran “may turn to closer military cooperation to protect their trade and security.” That doesn’t necessarily mean entering the war directly, he adds, “but it could narrow the Islamic Republic’s room for maneuver.”<\/p>\n

With direct talks between Iran and the US stalled, the world turned its attention to Qatar, Oman, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. While each nation plays a different role in the crisis, they all have a direct stake in ending the war<\/a>.<\/p>\n

“They are close to the US but also want to maintain ties with Iran and build regional alliances to prevent future conflicts,” Memarian says.<\/p>\n

Morovati says Washington’s failure to support its Arab allies during the war could eventually push them to reconsider their policies and turn to America’s rivals.<\/p>\n

During the campaign, US President Trump said he expected a deal with Tehran soon after the midterms vote. Meanwhile, the Reuters news agency cited three senior Iranian officials and an additional source as saying that Tehran has deliberately prolonged talks to weaken Trump politically.<\/p>\n

Memarian says Iran’s leaders believe a Republican defeat would increase pressure on Trump to end the war. But Trump will remain the key foreign policy decision-maker, and congressional pressure is unlikely to play a deciding role.<\/p>\n

He says the present moment offers the “best opportunity” to end the standoff before Trump leaves office in January 2029.<\/p>\n

“Iran’s leaders need to think about their endgame,” Memarian says, warning that Trump could launch a massive attack, inflict serious damage and then declare victory.<\/p>\n

To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video<\/a><\/p>\n

Daryakenari says “escalatory factors” will have the upper hand in the coming months and the likelihood of a military escalation is high.<\/p>\n

Tehran can only avert a new round of war with a fundamental policy shift\u00a0and concessions that Iranian leaders would see as close to surrender. However, he argues that such a retreat would also threaten the regime’s survival by weakening its ideological justification and eroding support.<\/p>\n

High oil prices, shipping risks and economic strain<\/a> are putting pressure on all sides as the war enters its ninth month. Could that push Tehran, Washington and regional capitals toward compromise?<\/p>\n

“The economy is the Achilles’ heel of every party to this war, and that holds even for countries beyond the region,” says Leila Morrovati.<\/p>\n

Energy prices as a source of pressure on the US government<\/a>,\u00a0she acknowledges.<\/p>\n

\u00a0“We’ve seen that energy supply and the expectations of the American public have been influential, and this is one of the problems the Trump administration faces,” she said.<\/p>\n

At the same time, she warns that the Arab states\u00a0do not act as a united bloc toward Tehran.<\/p>\n

“If they come under severe security and economic pressure, they may take joint action, but so far that hasn’t happened in practice,” she underlines.<\/p>\n

To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video<\/a><\/p>\n

Memarian also sees the economic costs as an incentive for a deal. But he also claims that each side believes that inflicting more pain on the other will strengthen its hand in future talks.<\/p>\n

“That can easily turn this into a war of attrition, and in recent months that has been the approach,” he says. Neither side has yet reached the point where it sees compromise as unavoidable.<\/p>\n

Edited by: Darko Janjevic<\/em><\/p>\n

[analyse_source url=”https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/trump-us-midterms-tehran-8-key-factors-driving-iran-war\/a-79831816″]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

[analyse_image type=”featured” src=”https:\/\/static.dw.com\/image\/79828848_6.jpg”] https:\/\/p.dw.com\/p\/5Oxtw Prefer DW on Google The Reuters news agency cited three senior Iranian officials and an additional source as saying that Tehran has deliberately prolonged talks to weaken Trump politicallyImage: Brendan Smialowski\/AFP The US Republican Party is entering the midterm elections with Donald Trump‘s administration seemingly unable to either win or diplomatically […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[226,74],"class_list":["post-2233086","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-politics","tag-crawlmanager","tag-dw-com"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/analyse.optim.biz\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2233086","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/analyse.optim.biz\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/analyse.optim.biz\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/analyse.optim.biz\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/analyse.optim.biz\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=2233086"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/analyse.optim.biz\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2233086\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/analyse.optim.biz\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=2233086"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/analyse.optim.biz\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=2233086"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/analyse.optim.biz\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=2233086"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}