{"id":1790128,"date":"2026-02-24T14:47:47","date_gmt":"2026-02-24T11:47:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/analyse.optim.biz\/?p=1790128"},"modified":"2026-02-24T14:47:47","modified_gmt":"2026-02-24T11:47:47","slug":"protecting-ukraines-capital-against-russias-drone-attacks","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/analyse.optim.biz\/?p=1790128","title":{"rendered":"Protecting Ukraine&#8217;s capital against Russia&#8217;s drone attacks"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>[analyse_image type=&#8221;featured&#8221; src=&#8221;https:\/\/static.dw.com\/image\/75310929_6.jpg&#8221;]<\/p>\n<article class=\"sk6xmai\">\n<div class=\"content-area sa7l9jt s9mg977\">\n<section data-tracking-name=\"sharing-icons-inline\" class=\"c75t7t0 hh5424a in-line closed\">\n<div class=\"copy-button-wrapper closed\"><span class=\"svdcmki\">https:\/\/p.dw.com\/p\/59I3e<\/span><\/div>\n<\/section>\n<figure class=\"s4bcs45\"><source type=\"image\/webp\" srcset=\"https:\/\/static.dw.com\/image\/75310929_800.webp 50w, https:\/\/static.dw.com\/image\/75310929_801.webp 129w, https:\/\/static.dw.com\/image\/75310929_802.webp 352w, https:\/\/static.dw.com\/image\/75310929_803.webp 575w\" media=\"(min-width: 0px) and (max-width: 575px)\" height=\"100\" width=\"100\" \/><figcaption class=\"c1oedowi lofg86o m4xla6a s16w0xvi rcjjkz7 w128axg5 b1fzgn0z\">Some soldiers fear the course of the war depends on who will first run out of fighters<small class=\"copyright c19ed66t ihwmx5 idu7i8u lxmvniw icns9en rcjjkz7 w128axg5 b1fzgn0z\">Image: Stringer\/REUTERS<\/small><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<div data-tracking-skip=\"true\" data-tracking-name=\"rich-text\" class=\"c17j8gzx rc0m0op r1ebneao s198y7xq rich-text l1evdo4u blt0baw s16w0xvi rcjjkz7 w128axg5 b1fzgn0z\">\n<p>Soldiers spend weeks or even months in a cramped shelter in a so-called &#8220;kill zone,&#8221;\u00a0a stretch as long as 20 kilometers (12 miles) that is largely controlled by enemy drones.\u00a0There is no way to reach a position by vehicle or evacuate the wounded. Ammunition and food supplies are constantly interrupted.<\/p>\n<p>All of this has become everyday life along the front line during four years of <a class=\"internal-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/russias-war-in-ukraine\/t-60931789\">Russia&#8217;s full\u2011scale war against Ukraine<\/a>. Ukrainian military personnel tell DW how the war has changed.<\/p>\n<h2>2022: Chaos, ground war and Western weapons<\/h2>\n<p>When soldiers think back to the start of the invasion, they remember the many volunteers and long lines at recruitment offices. That seems unimaginable today.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;I wasn&#8217;t allowed to join the army until September 2022,&#8221; said Oleksandr Kashaba, who was 22 at the time.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;There was chaos at the front back then,&#8221; recalled\u00a0Stanislav Kotcherha, deputy commander of a drone battalion. In early 2022, he had completed training as an air defense soldier and soon after joined the infantry. &#8220;There were many units, but no communication.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Later, the front line stabilized. &#8220;Then a real ground war began, with infantry, tanks, artillery and air forces as the main elements. A typical war, like you read about in books,&#8221; Kotcherha said.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"placeholder-image master_landscape big\"><img data-format=\"MASTER_LANDSCAPE\" data-id=\"64701008\" data-url=\"https:\/\/static.dw.com\/image\/64701008_${formatId}.jpg\" data-aspect-ratio=\"16\/9\" alt=\"Hijmars launcher firing a rocket from a highway in Ukraine\"><figcaption class=\"img-caption\">Hijmars rocket launchers were considered a &#8216;game changer&#8217;<small class=\"copyright\">Image: Armed Forces of Ukraine\/Cover Images\/IMAGO<\/small><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>In the same year, foreign rocket launchers, <a class=\"internal-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/what-role-are-himars-playing-in-ukraine\/a-62567364\">including HIMARS<\/a>, became a decisive &#8220;game changer,&#8221; said\u00a0Vladyslav Urubkov of the Come Back Alive foundation, which equips the Ukrainian Army with everything from vehicles to grenade launchers and organizes educational projects.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;The HIMARS had a big influence on the success of the counteroffensive in Kharkiv,&#8221; said Urubkov, who has since left the army.<\/p>\n<h2>2023: Drones and the counteroffensive<\/h2>\n<p>The next year, the Ukrainian military began using the Chinese quadcopter Mavic drone extensively, initially for aerial reconnaissance and soon as an attack drone dropping explosives. Later, kamikaze drones, deployed\u00a0heavily by both sides since the summer of 2023, were also used.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;I was lucky to serve in the infantry before drones dominated,&#8221;\u00a0said Kashaba, who first commanded an anti-aircraft platoon before later taking command of a machine gun platoon.<\/p>\n<div class=\"vjs-wrapper embed big\">\n<h2 aria-label=\"Embedded video \u2014 Protecting Ukraine's capital against Russia's drone attacks\" class=\"headline\">Protecting Ukraine&#8217;s capital against Russia&#8217;s drone attacks<\/h2>\n<p><video id=\"video-64653109\" controls playsinline preload=\"none\" poster=\"image\/png;base64,iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNkYAAAAAYAAjCB0C8AAAAASUVORK5CYII=\" data-id=\"64653109\" data-posterurl=\"https:\/\/static.dw.com\/image\/64652723_605.webp\" data-duration=\"02:35\"><source src=\"https:\/\/hlsvod.dw.com\/i\/dwtv_video\/flv\/je\/je20230209_Drones_,AVC_480x270,AVC_512x288,AVC_640x360,AVC_960x540,AVC_1280x720,AVC_1920x1080,.mp4.csmil\/master.m3u8\" type=\"application\/x-mpegURL\" \/><\/video><\/div>\n<p>Because of this shift, almost everything he did then is no longer possible on today&#8217;s battlefield. During the counteroffensive, Kashaba worked just under 1.5 kilometers from Russian positions with a large\u2011caliber US machine gun. He also traveled long distances across open terrain and handled logistics in an armored vehicle. He transported ammunition and supplies, rotated personnel and evacuated people.<\/p>\n<p>At that time, the wounded were transported about 4 kilometers\u00a0in an armored vehicle to where an evacuation team was waiting. From there, that team took them in unarmored vehicles to a stabilization point behind the lines. Because the kill\u00a0zone is now much larger, this is no longer possible today.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Back then, the wounded reached us a few hours after being hit. Now it takes days,&#8221; explained\u00a0a paramedic known by the call sign &#8220;Kazhan,&#8221; who is part of an evacuation team.<\/p>\n<h2>2024: Transformation of the front line<\/h2>\n<p>In February 2024, the Russian army began advancing rapidly in the Donetsk region. At that exact moment, the shortage of soldiers at the front became noticeable, recalled\u00a0Kashaba, who was transferred to headquarters at the time due to injuries.<\/p>\n<p>Meanwhile, drone development continued. The Ukrainian military was the first to use hexacopters. These were used to engage targets and deploy mines over greater distances, as well as for logistical purposes. At the same time, electronic warfare tools were developed.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"placeholder-image master_landscape big\"><img data-format=\"MASTER_LANDSCAPE\" data-id=\"76087643\" data-url=\"https:\/\/static.dw.com\/image\/76087643_${formatId}.jpg\" data-aspect-ratio=\"16\/9\" alt=\"Soldiers prepare a reconnaissance drone in Ukraine's Kharkiv region\"><figcaption class=\"img-caption\">Drones have become a crucial element of Ukraine&#8217;s defenses and Russia&#8217;s attacks<small class=\"copyright\">Image: Vyacheslav Madiyevskyy\/REUTERS<\/small><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>According to Urubkov from the Come Back Alive foundation, kamikaze drones fundamentally changed the war. &#8220;The biggest leap occurred in late 2023 and early 2024, when deliveries of Western artillery shells were delayed,&#8221; he said. In the battles for Avdiivka at that time, the Ukrainians used FPV drones against the Russians, who had artillery superiority.<\/p>\n<p>For Kotcherha, the deputy drone battalion commander, the rise of FPV drones is less about a &#8220;lack of ammunition&#8221; than\u00a0the efficiency and relatively low cost of kamikaze drones. Both sides deployed attack drones more widely simultaneously.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Units on the front had to adapt, dig positions, camouflage them and protect them from drones. Equipment had to be moved off the front line. At the start of the war, a tank might be three kilometers from the front line; since 2024, it has to be 10-15 kilometers away. The range of inexpensive and precise munitions has increased,&#8221; he explained.<\/p>\n<p>As a result, infantrymen must hide underground and are less able to monitor the front line. Consequently, &#8220;the enemy infiltrated in small groups,&#8221; Kotcherha said.<\/p>\n<h2>2025: Kursk operation and ground robots<\/h2>\n<p>Summer 2024 was marked by the <a class=\"internal-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/ukraines-kursk-offensive-how-worried-are-local-russians\/a-69940164\">start of the Kursk offensive<\/a>. The Ukrainian military quickly advanced into Russian territory but could not hold its positions.<\/p>\n<p>By spring 2025, the operation was over. One reason for the success of the Russian counteroffensive at the time was fiber\u2011optic drones, which\u00a0are resistant to electronic disruption. <\/p>\n<div class=\"vjs-wrapper embed big\">\n<h2 aria-label=\"Embedded video \u2014 Fiber-optic drones new twist to Russia's war in Ukraine\" class=\"headline\">Fiber-optic drones new twist to Russia&#8217;s war in Ukraine<\/h2>\n<p><video id=\"video-73716036\" controls playsinline preload=\"none\" poster=\"image\/png;base64,iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNkYAAAAAYAAjCB0C8AAAAASUVORK5CYII=\" data-id=\"73716036\" data-posterurl=\"https:\/\/static.dw.com\/image\/73732069_605.webp\" data-duration=\"04:47\"><source src=\"https:\/\/hlsvod.dw.com\/i\/dwtv_video\/flv\/je\/je20250826_FiberOpticInsN_,AVC_480x270,AVC_512x288,AVC_640x360,AVC_960x540,AVC_1280x720,AVC_1920x1080,.mp4.csmil\/master.m3u8\" type=\"application\/x-mpegURL\" \/><\/video><\/div>\n<p>&#8220;At some point, the Russians began attacking every vehicle heading toward Kursk with these drones,&#8221; said &#8220;Kazhan,&#8221; the paramedic. &#8220;We drove at night, and it was very frightening because you know you have no way to counter those drones.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>At the same time, &#8220;Kazhan&#8221;\u00a0observed that the number of wounded dropped. &#8220;In 2024, in the Avdiivka area, there were days when up to 200 wounded came to us. Then it decreased significantly. The main problem is the kill zone, which in some places is 20 to 25 kilometers wide. It widened due to the use of technology. People can now be killed with more precision. That makes it harder to evacuate the severely injured,&#8221; she says.<\/p>\n<p>Military doctors now advise the wounded by video link directly at their positions and send them medicine by drones. This way, soldiers with amputations and bleeding can survive even when evacuation isn&#8217;t possible for weeks. Ground robots are now also used to evacuate the wounded. They are also used to deliver supplies to positions and are equipped with machine guns.<\/p>\n<div class=\"vjs-wrapper embed big\">\n<h2 aria-label=\"Embedded video \u2014 How Ukraine uses drones to get supplies to the front lines\" class=\"headline\">How Ukraine uses drones to get supplies to the front lines<\/h2>\n<p><video id=\"video-74420136\" controls playsinline preload=\"none\" poster=\"image\/png;base64,iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNkYAAAAAYAAjCB0C8AAAAASUVORK5CYII=\" data-id=\"74420136\" data-posterurl=\"https:\/\/static.dw.com\/image\/74356121_605.webp\" data-duration=\"04:39\"><source src=\"https:\/\/hlsvod.dw.com\/i\/dwtv_video\/flv\/je\/je20251020_QSUPPLY09A_,AVC_480x270,AVC_512x288,AVC_640x360,AVC_960x540,AVC_1280x720,AVC_1920x1080,.mp4.csmil\/master.m3u8\" type=\"application\/x-mpegURL\" \/><\/video><\/div>\n<p>One development the military observed in 2025 was attempts to &#8220;take each other&#8217;s eyes out&#8221; \u2014 shooting down reconnaissance drones. In response, Ukraine is actively working on interceptor drones. At first, volunteers handled this, but now Ukraine has an entire infrastructure,\u00a0Urubkov said.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;This is a reaction to the massively expanded production of reconnaissance drones by the Russians.&#8221;<\/p>\n<h2>2026: An uncertain\u00a0outlook<\/h2>\n<p>From Urubkov&#8217;s perspective, the most significant event at the start of 2026 is cutting Russian troops off from the <a class=\"internal-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/starlink-how-elon-musks-company-influences-geopolitics\/a-75963477\">Starlink terminals<\/a> they used to coordinate units and control drones.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Our advantage was using Starlink,&#8221; he says, noting that over time, the Russians also found a way to use the satellite network. &#8220;What we can do at the front thanks to Starlink, hopefully the Russians won&#8217;t be able to anymore,&#8221; Urubkov says.<\/p>\n<div class=\"vjs-wrapper embed big\">\n<h2 aria-label=\"Embedded video \u2014 How reliable is Starlink as a wartime communications line?\" class=\"headline\">How reliable is Starlink as a wartime communications line?<\/h2>\n<p><video id=\"video-75588963\" controls playsinline preload=\"none\" poster=\"image\/png;base64,iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNkYAAAAAYAAjCB0C8AAAAASUVORK5CYII=\" data-id=\"75588963\" data-posterurl=\"https:\/\/static.dw.com\/image\/75547897_605.webp\" data-duration=\"01:49\"><source src=\"https:\/\/hlsvod.dw.com\/i\/dwtv_video\/flv\/je\/je20260121_qspace09c_,AVC_480x270,AVC_512x288,AVC_640x360,AVC_960x540,AVC_1280x720,AVC_1920x1080,.mp4.csmil\/master.m3u8\" type=\"application\/x-mpegURL\" \/><\/video><\/div>\n<p>He also hopes technological development continues: &#8220;Under these conditions, people at the front become ever more vulnerable. We are in a strategically defensive position. With few exceptions, this war is a strategic offensive by the enemy, taking the initiative. Our work is mainly in defense. I would like to change that.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Kashaba, the machine gun platoon commander, doesn&#8217;t believe that technological development can influence the course of the war.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;I think all significant technological changes have already happened and that the course of the war now depends on who will first run out of soldiers who can fight under conditions of total drone dominance,&#8221; he said.<\/p>\n<p><em>This article was originally published in Ukrainian.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/article>\n<div data-tracking-skip=\"true\" data-tracking-name=\"rich-text\" class=\"c17j8gzx rc0m0op r1ebneao s198y7xq rich-text l1evdo4u blt0baw s16w0xvi rcjjkz7 w128axg5 b1fzgn0z\">\n<p>Soldiers spend weeks or even months in a cramped shelter in a so-called &#8220;kill zone,&#8221;\u00a0a stretch as long as 20 kilometers (12 miles) that is largely controlled by enemy drones.\u00a0There is no way to reach a position by vehicle or evacuate the wounded. Ammunition and food supplies are constantly interrupted.<\/p>\n<p>All of this has become everyday life along the front line during four years of <a class=\"internal-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/russias-war-in-ukraine\/t-60931789\">Russia&#8217;s full\u2011scale war against Ukraine<\/a>. Ukrainian military personnel tell DW how the war has changed.<\/p>\n<h2>2022: Chaos, ground war and Western weapons<\/h2>\n<p>When soldiers think back to the start of the invasion, they remember the many volunteers and long lines at recruitment offices. That seems unimaginable today.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;I wasn&#8217;t allowed to join the army until September 2022,&#8221; said Oleksandr Kashaba, who was 22 at the time.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;There was chaos at the front back then,&#8221; recalled\u00a0Stanislav Kotcherha, deputy commander of a drone battalion. In early 2022, he had completed training as an air defense soldier and soon after joined the infantry. &#8220;There were many units, but no communication.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Later, the front line stabilized. &#8220;Then a real ground war began, with infantry, tanks, artillery and air forces as the main elements. A typical war, like you read about in books,&#8221; Kotcherha said.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"placeholder-image master_landscape big\"><img data-format=\"MASTER_LANDSCAPE\" data-id=\"64701008\" data-url=\"https:\/\/static.dw.com\/image\/64701008_${formatId}.jpg\" data-aspect-ratio=\"16\/9\" alt=\"Hijmars launcher firing a rocket from a highway in Ukraine\"><figcaption class=\"img-caption\">Hijmars rocket launchers were considered a &#8216;game changer&#8217;<small class=\"copyright\">Image: Armed Forces of Ukraine\/Cover Images\/IMAGO<\/small><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>In the same year, foreign rocket launchers, <a class=\"internal-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/what-role-are-himars-playing-in-ukraine\/a-62567364\">including HIMARS<\/a>, became a decisive &#8220;game changer,&#8221; said\u00a0Vladyslav Urubkov of the Come Back Alive foundation, which equips the Ukrainian Army with everything from vehicles to grenade launchers and organizes educational projects.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;The HIMARS had a big influence on the success of the counteroffensive in Kharkiv,&#8221; said Urubkov, who has since left the army.<\/p>\n<h2>2023: Drones and the counteroffensive<\/h2>\n<p>The next year, the Ukrainian military began using the Chinese quadcopter Mavic drone extensively, initially for aerial reconnaissance and soon as an attack drone dropping explosives. Later, kamikaze drones, deployed\u00a0heavily by both sides since the summer of 2023, were also used.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;I was lucky to serve in the infantry before drones dominated,&#8221;\u00a0said Kashaba, who first commanded an anti-aircraft platoon before later taking command of a machine gun platoon.<\/p>\n<div class=\"vjs-wrapper embed big\">\n<h2 aria-label=\"Embedded video \u2014 Protecting Ukraine's capital against Russia's drone attacks\" class=\"headline\">Protecting Ukraine&#8217;s capital against Russia&#8217;s drone attacks<\/h2>\n<p><video id=\"video-64653109\" controls playsinline preload=\"none\" poster=\"image\/png;base64,iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNkYAAAAAYAAjCB0C8AAAAASUVORK5CYII=\" data-id=\"64653109\" data-posterurl=\"https:\/\/static.dw.com\/image\/64652723_605.webp\" data-duration=\"02:35\"><source src=\"https:\/\/hlsvod.dw.com\/i\/dwtv_video\/flv\/je\/je20230209_Drones_,AVC_480x270,AVC_512x288,AVC_640x360,AVC_960x540,AVC_1280x720,AVC_1920x1080,.mp4.csmil\/master.m3u8\" type=\"application\/x-mpegURL\" \/><\/video><\/div>\n<p>Because of this shift, almost everything he did then is no longer possible on today&#8217;s battlefield. During the counteroffensive, Kashaba worked just under 1.5 kilometers from Russian positions with a large\u2011caliber US machine gun. He also traveled long distances across open terrain and handled logistics in an armored vehicle. He transported ammunition and supplies, rotated personnel and evacuated people.<\/p>\n<p>At that time, the wounded were transported about 4 kilometers\u00a0in an armored vehicle to where an evacuation team was waiting. From there, that team took them in unarmored vehicles to a stabilization point behind the lines. Because the kill\u00a0zone is now much larger, this is no longer possible today.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Back then, the wounded reached us a few hours after being hit. Now it takes days,&#8221; explained\u00a0a paramedic known by the call sign &#8220;Kazhan,&#8221; who is part of an evacuation team.<\/p>\n<h2>2024: Transformation of the front line<\/h2>\n<p>In February 2024, the Russian army began advancing rapidly in the Donetsk region. At that exact moment, the shortage of soldiers at the front became noticeable, recalled\u00a0Kashaba, who was transferred to headquarters at the time due to injuries.<\/p>\n<p>Meanwhile, drone development continued. The Ukrainian military was the first to use hexacopters. These were used to engage targets and deploy mines over greater distances, as well as for logistical purposes. At the same time, electronic warfare tools were developed.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"placeholder-image master_landscape big\"><img data-format=\"MASTER_LANDSCAPE\" data-id=\"76087643\" data-url=\"https:\/\/static.dw.com\/image\/76087643_${formatId}.jpg\" data-aspect-ratio=\"16\/9\" alt=\"Soldiers prepare a reconnaissance drone in Ukraine's Kharkiv region\"><figcaption class=\"img-caption\">Drones have become a crucial element of Ukraine&#8217;s defenses and Russia&#8217;s attacks<small class=\"copyright\">Image: Vyacheslav Madiyevskyy\/REUTERS<\/small><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>According to Urubkov from the Come Back Alive foundation, kamikaze drones fundamentally changed the war. &#8220;The biggest leap occurred in late 2023 and early 2024, when deliveries of Western artillery shells were delayed,&#8221; he said. In the battles for Avdiivka at that time, the Ukrainians used FPV drones against the Russians, who had artillery superiority.<\/p>\n<p>For Kotcherha, the deputy drone battalion commander, the rise of FPV drones is less about a &#8220;lack of ammunition&#8221; than\u00a0the efficiency and relatively low cost of kamikaze drones. Both sides deployed attack drones more widely simultaneously.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Units on the front had to adapt, dig positions, camouflage them and protect them from drones. Equipment had to be moved off the front line. At the start of the war, a tank might be three kilometers from the front line; since 2024, it has to be 10-15 kilometers away. The range of inexpensive and precise munitions has increased,&#8221; he explained.<\/p>\n<p>As a result, infantrymen must hide underground and are less able to monitor the front line. Consequently, &#8220;the enemy infiltrated in small groups,&#8221; Kotcherha said.<\/p>\n<h2>2025: Kursk operation and ground robots<\/h2>\n<p>Summer 2024 was marked by the <a class=\"internal-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/ukraines-kursk-offensive-how-worried-are-local-russians\/a-69940164\">start of the Kursk offensive<\/a>. The Ukrainian military quickly advanced into Russian territory but could not hold its positions.<\/p>\n<p>By spring 2025, the operation was over. One reason for the success of the Russian counteroffensive at the time was fiber\u2011optic drones, which\u00a0are resistant to electronic disruption. <\/p>\n<div class=\"vjs-wrapper embed big\">\n<h2 aria-label=\"Embedded video \u2014 Fiber-optic drones new twist to Russia's war in Ukraine\" class=\"headline\">Fiber-optic drones new twist to Russia&#8217;s war in Ukraine<\/h2>\n<p><video id=\"video-73716036\" controls playsinline preload=\"none\" poster=\"image\/png;base64,iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNkYAAAAAYAAjCB0C8AAAAASUVORK5CYII=\" data-id=\"73716036\" data-posterurl=\"https:\/\/static.dw.com\/image\/73732069_605.webp\" data-duration=\"04:47\"><source src=\"https:\/\/hlsvod.dw.com\/i\/dwtv_video\/flv\/je\/je20250826_FiberOpticInsN_,AVC_480x270,AVC_512x288,AVC_640x360,AVC_960x540,AVC_1280x720,AVC_1920x1080,.mp4.csmil\/master.m3u8\" type=\"application\/x-mpegURL\" \/><\/video><\/div>\n<p>&#8220;At some point, the Russians began attacking every vehicle heading toward Kursk with these drones,&#8221; said &#8220;Kazhan,&#8221; the paramedic. &#8220;We drove at night, and it was very frightening because you know you have no way to counter those drones.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>At the same time, &#8220;Kazhan&#8221;\u00a0observed that the number of wounded dropped. &#8220;In 2024, in the Avdiivka area, there were days when up to 200 wounded came to us. Then it decreased significantly. The main problem is the kill zone, which in some places is 20 to 25 kilometers wide. It widened due to the use of technology. People can now be killed with more precision. That makes it harder to evacuate the severely injured,&#8221; she says.<\/p>\n<p>Military doctors now advise the wounded by video link directly at their positions and send them medicine by drones. This way, soldiers with amputations and bleeding can survive even when evacuation isn&#8217;t possible for weeks. Ground robots are now also used to evacuate the wounded. They are also used to deliver supplies to positions and are equipped with machine guns.<\/p>\n<div class=\"vjs-wrapper embed big\">\n<h2 aria-label=\"Embedded video \u2014 How Ukraine uses drones to get supplies to the front lines\" class=\"headline\">How Ukraine uses drones to get supplies to the front lines<\/h2>\n<p><video id=\"video-74420136\" controls playsinline preload=\"none\" poster=\"image\/png;base64,iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNkYAAAAAYAAjCB0C8AAAAASUVORK5CYII=\" data-id=\"74420136\" data-posterurl=\"https:\/\/static.dw.com\/image\/74356121_605.webp\" data-duration=\"04:39\"><source src=\"https:\/\/hlsvod.dw.com\/i\/dwtv_video\/flv\/je\/je20251020_QSUPPLY09A_,AVC_480x270,AVC_512x288,AVC_640x360,AVC_960x540,AVC_1280x720,AVC_1920x1080,.mp4.csmil\/master.m3u8\" type=\"application\/x-mpegURL\" \/><\/video><\/div>\n<p>One development the military observed in 2025 was attempts to &#8220;take each other&#8217;s eyes out&#8221; \u2014 shooting down reconnaissance drones. In response, Ukraine is actively working on interceptor drones. At first, volunteers handled this, but now Ukraine has an entire infrastructure,\u00a0Urubkov said.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;This is a reaction to the massively expanded production of reconnaissance drones by the Russians.&#8221;<\/p>\n<h2>2026: An uncertain\u00a0outlook<\/h2>\n<p>From Urubkov&#8217;s perspective, the most significant event at the start of 2026 is cutting Russian troops off from the <a class=\"internal-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/starlink-how-elon-musks-company-influences-geopolitics\/a-75963477\">Starlink terminals<\/a> they used to coordinate units and control drones.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Our advantage was using Starlink,&#8221; he says, noting that over time, the Russians also found a way to use the satellite network. &#8220;What we can do at the front thanks to Starlink, hopefully the Russians won&#8217;t be able to anymore,&#8221; Urubkov says.<\/p>\n<div class=\"vjs-wrapper embed big\">\n<h2 aria-label=\"Embedded video \u2014 How reliable is Starlink as a wartime communications line?\" class=\"headline\">How reliable is Starlink as a wartime communications line?<\/h2>\n<p><video id=\"video-75588963\" controls playsinline preload=\"none\" poster=\"image\/png;base64,iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNkYAAAAAYAAjCB0C8AAAAASUVORK5CYII=\" data-id=\"75588963\" data-posterurl=\"https:\/\/static.dw.com\/image\/75547897_605.webp\" data-duration=\"01:49\"><source src=\"https:\/\/hlsvod.dw.com\/i\/dwtv_video\/flv\/je\/je20260121_qspace09c_,AVC_480x270,AVC_512x288,AVC_640x360,AVC_960x540,AVC_1280x720,AVC_1920x1080,.mp4.csmil\/master.m3u8\" type=\"application\/x-mpegURL\" \/><\/video><\/div>\n<p>He also hopes technological development continues: &#8220;Under these conditions, people at the front become ever more vulnerable. We are in a strategically defensive position. With few exceptions, this war is a strategic offensive by the enemy, taking the initiative. Our work is mainly in defense. I would like to change that.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Kashaba, the machine gun platoon commander, doesn&#8217;t believe that technological development can influence the course of the war.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;I think all significant technological changes have already happened and that the course of the war now depends on who will first run out of soldiers who can fight under conditions of total drone dominance,&#8221; he said.<\/p>\n<p><em>This article was originally published in Ukrainian.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>Soldiers spend weeks or even months in a cramped shelter in a so-called &#8220;kill zone,&#8221;\u00a0a stretch as long as 20 kilometers (12 miles) that is largely controlled by enemy drones.\u00a0There is no way to reach a position by vehicle or evacuate the wounded. Ammunition and food supplies are constantly interrupted.<\/p>\n<p>All of this has become everyday life along the front line during four years of <a class=\"internal-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/russias-war-in-ukraine\/t-60931789\">Russia&#8217;s full\u2011scale war against Ukraine<\/a>. Ukrainian military personnel tell DW how the war has changed.<\/p>\n<p>When soldiers think back to the start of the invasion, they remember the many volunteers and long lines at recruitment offices. That seems unimaginable today.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;I wasn&#8217;t allowed to join the army until September 2022,&#8221; said Oleksandr Kashaba, who was 22 at the time.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;There was chaos at the front back then,&#8221; recalled\u00a0Stanislav Kotcherha, deputy commander of a drone battalion. In early 2022, he had completed training as an air defense soldier and soon after joined the infantry. &#8220;There were many units, but no communication.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Later, the front line stabilized. &#8220;Then a real ground war began, with infantry, tanks, artillery and air forces as the main elements. A typical war, like you read about in books,&#8221; Kotcherha said.<\/p>\n<p>In the same year, foreign rocket launchers, <a class=\"internal-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/what-role-are-himars-playing-in-ukraine\/a-62567364\">including HIMARS<\/a>, became a decisive &#8220;game changer,&#8221; said\u00a0Vladyslav Urubkov of the Come Back Alive foundation, which equips the Ukrainian Army with everything from vehicles to grenade launchers and organizes educational projects.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;The HIMARS had a big influence on the success of the counteroffensive in Kharkiv,&#8221; said Urubkov, who has since left the army.<\/p>\n<p>The next year, the Ukrainian military began using the Chinese quadcopter Mavic drone extensively, initially for aerial reconnaissance and soon as an attack drone dropping explosives. Later, kamikaze drones, deployed\u00a0heavily by both sides since the summer of 2023, were also used.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;I was lucky to serve in the infantry before drones dominated,&#8221;\u00a0said Kashaba, who first commanded an anti-aircraft platoon before later taking command of a machine gun platoon.<\/p>\n<p class=\"vjs-no-js\">To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that <a href=\"https:\/\/videojs.com\/html5-video-support\/\" target=\"_blank\">supports HTML5 video<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Because of this shift, almost everything he did then is no longer possible on today&#8217;s battlefield. During the counteroffensive, Kashaba worked just under 1.5 kilometers from Russian positions with a large\u2011caliber US machine gun. He also traveled long distances across open terrain and handled logistics in an armored vehicle. He transported ammunition and supplies, rotated personnel and evacuated people.<\/p>\n<p>At that time, the wounded were transported about 4 kilometers\u00a0in an armored vehicle to where an evacuation team was waiting. From there, that team took them in unarmored vehicles to a stabilization point behind the lines. Because the kill\u00a0zone is now much larger, this is no longer possible today.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Back then, the wounded reached us a few hours after being hit. Now it takes days,&#8221; explained\u00a0a paramedic known by the call sign &#8220;Kazhan,&#8221; who is part of an evacuation team.<\/p>\n<p>In February 2024, the Russian army began advancing rapidly in the Donetsk region. At that exact moment, the shortage of soldiers at the front became noticeable, recalled\u00a0Kashaba, who was transferred to headquarters at the time due to injuries.<\/p>\n<p>Meanwhile, drone development continued. The Ukrainian military was the first to use hexacopters. These were used to engage targets and deploy mines over greater distances, as well as for logistical purposes. At the same time, electronic warfare tools were developed.<\/p>\n<p>According to Urubkov from the Come Back Alive foundation, kamikaze drones fundamentally changed the war. &#8220;The biggest leap occurred in late 2023 and early 2024, when deliveries of Western artillery shells were delayed,&#8221; he said. In the battles for Avdiivka at that time, the Ukrainians used FPV drones against the Russians, who had artillery superiority.<\/p>\n<p>For Kotcherha, the deputy drone battalion commander, the rise of FPV drones is less about a &#8220;lack of ammunition&#8221; than\u00a0the efficiency and relatively low cost of kamikaze drones. Both sides deployed attack drones more widely simultaneously.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Units on the front had to adapt, dig positions, camouflage them and protect them from drones. Equipment had to be moved off the front line. At the start of the war, a tank might be three kilometers from the front line; since 2024, it has to be 10-15 kilometers away. The range of inexpensive and precise munitions has increased,&#8221; he explained.<\/p>\n<p>As a result, infantrymen must hide underground and are less able to monitor the front line. Consequently, &#8220;the enemy infiltrated in small groups,&#8221; Kotcherha said.<\/p>\n<p>Summer 2024 was marked by the <a class=\"internal-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/ukraines-kursk-offensive-how-worried-are-local-russians\/a-69940164\">start of the Kursk offensive<\/a>. The Ukrainian military quickly advanced into Russian territory but could not hold its positions.<\/p>\n<p>By spring 2025, the operation was over. One reason for the success of the Russian counteroffensive at the time was fiber\u2011optic drones, which\u00a0are resistant to electronic disruption. <\/p>\n<p class=\"vjs-no-js\">To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that <a href=\"https:\/\/videojs.com\/html5-video-support\/\" target=\"_blank\">supports HTML5 video<\/a><\/p>\n<p>&#8220;At some point, the Russians began attacking every vehicle heading toward Kursk with these drones,&#8221; said &#8220;Kazhan,&#8221; the paramedic. &#8220;We drove at night, and it was very frightening because you know you have no way to counter those drones.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>At the same time, &#8220;Kazhan&#8221;\u00a0observed that the number of wounded dropped. &#8220;In 2024, in the Avdiivka area, there were days when up to 200 wounded came to us. Then it decreased significantly. The main problem is the kill zone, which in some places is 20 to 25 kilometers wide. It widened due to the use of technology. People can now be killed with more precision. That makes it harder to evacuate the severely injured,&#8221; she says.<\/p>\n<p>Military doctors now advise the wounded by video link directly at their positions and send them medicine by drones. This way, soldiers with amputations and bleeding can survive even when evacuation isn&#8217;t possible for weeks. Ground robots are now also used to evacuate the wounded. They are also used to deliver supplies to positions and are equipped with machine guns.<\/p>\n<p class=\"vjs-no-js\">To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that <a href=\"https:\/\/videojs.com\/html5-video-support\/\" target=\"_blank\">supports HTML5 video<\/a><\/p>\n<p>One development the military observed in 2025 was attempts to &#8220;take each other&#8217;s eyes out&#8221; \u2014 shooting down reconnaissance drones. In response, Ukraine is actively working on interceptor drones. At first, volunteers handled this, but now Ukraine has an entire infrastructure,\u00a0Urubkov said.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;This is a reaction to the massively expanded production of reconnaissance drones by the Russians.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>From Urubkov&#8217;s perspective, the most significant event at the start of 2026 is cutting Russian troops off from the <a class=\"internal-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/starlink-how-elon-musks-company-influences-geopolitics\/a-75963477\">Starlink terminals<\/a> they used to coordinate units and control drones.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Our advantage was using Starlink,&#8221; he says, noting that over time, the Russians also found a way to use the satellite network. &#8220;What we can do at the front thanks to Starlink, hopefully the Russians won&#8217;t be able to anymore,&#8221; Urubkov says.<\/p>\n<p class=\"vjs-no-js\">To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that <a href=\"https:\/\/videojs.com\/html5-video-support\/\" target=\"_blank\">supports HTML5 video<\/a><\/p>\n<p>He also hopes technological development continues: &#8220;Under these conditions, people at the front become ever more vulnerable. We are in a strategically defensive position. With few exceptions, this war is a strategic offensive by the enemy, taking the initiative. Our work is mainly in defense. I would like to change that.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Kashaba, the machine gun platoon commander, doesn&#8217;t believe that technological development can influence the course of the war.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;I think all significant technological changes have already happened and that the course of the war now depends on who will first run out of soldiers who can fight under conditions of total drone dominance,&#8221; he said.<\/p>\n<p><em>This article was originally published in Ukrainian.<\/em><\/p>\n<p>[analyse_source url=&#8221;https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/russia-ukraine-war-drones-starlink-evacuations-front-line-changes-since-2022\/a-76096050&#8243;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>[analyse_image type=&#8221;featured&#8221; src=&#8221;https:\/\/static.dw.com\/image\/75310929_6.jpg&#8221;] https:\/\/p.dw.com\/p\/59I3e Some soldiers fear the course of the war depends on who will first run out of fightersImage: Stringer\/REUTERS Soldiers spend weeks or even months in a cramped shelter in a so-called &#8220;kill zone,&#8221;\u00a0a stretch as long as 20 kilometers (12 miles) that is largely controlled by enemy drones.\u00a0There is no way [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[226,74],"class_list":["post-1790128","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-politics","tag-crawlmanager","tag-dw-com"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/analyse.optim.biz\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1790128","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/analyse.optim.biz\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/analyse.optim.biz\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/analyse.optim.biz\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/analyse.optim.biz\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1790128"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/analyse.optim.biz\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1790128\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/analyse.optim.biz\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1790128"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/analyse.optim.biz\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1790128"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/analyse.optim.biz\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1790128"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}